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THE COGNITIVE BASES FOR FRAMING EFFECTS
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We proceed first by discussing some general principles of the orga
nization of knowledge and information processing; second, we discuss
the importance of stories and narrative to understanding, recall, and
the organization of knowledge; third, we take up the role of news in
creating impressions of the political actors it discusses; fourth, we
build from news and impression formation to account for the way
strategic news frames might affect trust; finally, we explain existing
findings on agenda setting, media priming, and framing in terms of
our model of the psychology of news processing.
Previewing the Theory

Our theory may be summarized as follows:
1. Knowledge of politics is organized as connections among
concepts or constructs in memory (sometimes called "nodes") that
differ in how easily they can be accessed. These nodes hold substan
tive, emotional, and personal trait qualities.
2. The pattern of connections is through associations (some
times hierarchical ones); activation spreads through the knowledge
store along these lines of association.
3. Access to knowledge depends on activation, which in turn
depends on recency and frequency of prior activation, chronic ease
of access, and current external stimulation.
4. Framing makes certain information in a news story salient
and depresses the importance of other information. News frames
stimulate access to certain information, making it more accessible at
least temporarily. Priming and the spread of activation are the
mechanisms through which news frames stimulate thought pro
cesses and emotional reactions.
5. The knowledge activated by news frames accomplished
through priming and spreading activation alters the accessibility of
beliefs through changes in the ease of activation and through cuing
scripts {or stock stories) pertinent to the topic.
6. The judgments activated by news frames take place in two
ways: recall of information as the basis for political judgments; tal
lying the affective implications of information as judgments (i.e.,
on-line).
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7. News frames that describe the behavior of a political actor or
entity invite inferences by the citizen about the character of the
actor (sometimes called character traits). These traits are both
knowledge about the entity and have evaluative implications for
how the person feels about the actor. When a single trait is impli•
cated again and again, it can become the organizing ''theme" for the
person's theory about the actor or about political actors in general.
8. Strategic frames describe the behavior of politicians, make
salient the self.interest of those actions, invite negative character
attributions, cue stock stories about "politics as usual," and reinforce
cynicism (as mistrust).
9. News stories, even those strategically framed, often carry
substantive information about issues, albeit set in the context of
self.interested manipulation. Attentive exposure can alter political
knowledge by increasing the accessibility of information, changing
the associations among constructs, and cuing and strengthening
existing localized networks of concepts.
In the following sections, we develop the components of the expla•
nation.
Knowledge, Association, and Spreading Activation
Any serious explanation of the process of learning and political judg·
ment must begin with assumptions about how people organize the
information they have and how they organize information about poli•
tics in particular. 1
Models of how knowledge is stored in memory are numerous and
diverse. Some assume that there are both visual and conceptual bases
to knowledge,2 others argue that propositional structures are all that
we need.3 Some models adopt the view that constructs are linked
through networks of association that are hierarchical,4 associational
without hierarchy or differentiation,5 or associational with some hier·
archical structure.6
We cannot determine which model of knowledge storage is correct
because current research tools do not allow direct access to the mental
storehouse of knowledge. So the best assumptions are those that work
to solve problems and paradoxes in observable data. We assume that
knowledge is stored as a network of associations between nodes where

